CNSC welcomes feedback on any regulatory document at any time REGDOC- supersedes RD, Design of New Nuclear Power. CNSC has issued its Fukushima report – posted on the CNSC website on that the design intent complies with CNSC design requirements (RD, RD-. Re: The Approvals Process for New Reactors in Canada – RD & RD ( CNSC) request for feedback on the comments received on the.

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Any alternative approach should demonstrate equivalence to the outcomes associated with the use of the expectations set out in this regulatory document.

The design provides protection against deformations to reactor structures that have the potential to adversely affect the behaviour of the rc-337 or associated systems.

At least one of the two isolation valves is either automatic or powered, and operable from the main and secondary control rooms. This expectation extends to the provision of adequate capacity flow rate and storage volumes in the systems performing this function. Confinement A dnsc boundary without openings or penetrations such as windows that prevents the transport of gases or particulates out of the enclosed space.

The auxiliary feedwater, boiler pressure control, and other auxiliary systems, prevent the escalation of AOOs to accident conditions. Cns sink A system or component that provides a path for heat-transfer from a source such as heat generated in the fuel, to a large heat absorbing medium. A reliability analysis is performed for each of these SSCs.

RD Design of New Nuclear Power Plants – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Automatic activation of the engineered design features minimizes the need for operator actions in the early phase of a DBA. Other documents in this series include: The revised requirements and new guidance also take into account findings from a benchmarking study, which compared RD against the design requirements of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Finland and the Western European Regulators Association to identify differences in objective, scope and level of detail.

The design provides a sufficient number of safe escape routes that will be available in all plant states, including seismic events.

The reactor core control system detects and intercepts deviations from normal operation with the goal of preventing AOOs from escalating to accident conditions.

Human factors verification and validation plans are established for all appropriate stages of the design process to confirm that the design adequately accommodates all necessary operator actions.

For extreme events, there is at least one means of reactor shutdown and core cooling. Process Set of cnsf activities that transform inputs into outputs. These standards and codes are implemented throughout the life cycle of the system or equipment, particularly during the software development cycle.


Document History of REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants

All closed piping service systems have at least one single isolation valve on each line penetrating the containment, with the valve being located outside of, but as close as practicable to, the containment structure. A test acceptance leakage rate provides the maximum rate acceptable under actual measurement tests. The design provides two independent means of preventing recriticality from any pathway or mechanism during the GSS.

The concept of defence-in-depth is applied to all organizational, behavioural, and design-related safety and security activities to ensure that they are subject to overlapping provisions. Verification and validation activities are comprehensive, such that the design conforms to human factors design principles and meets usability requirements.

Defence-in-depth level two is achieved by controlling plant behaviour during and following a PIE using both inherent and engineered design features to rd-373 or exclude uncontrolled transients to the extent possible.

Gd-337 Power Plantsplease contact:. The safety parameter display system is designed and installed such that the same information is made available in a secure manner to the emergency support centre. The design makes adequate provision to protect the environment and to mitigate the impact of the NPP on the environment.

As a minimum, this display system provides the information required to facilitate the management of the reactor when the MCR is uninhabitable. R-d337 and recording equipment is such that essential information is available to support plant procedures during and following accidents by:.

SSCs important to safety are designed and located in a manner that minimizes the probability and effects of fires and explosions caused by external or internal events. Adequate means are provided to maintain both bulk and spatial power distributions within a predetermined range.

For this means of shutdown, a transient recriticality may be permitted in exceptional circumstances if the specified fuel and component limits are not exceeded. Fire A process of combustion characterized by heat emission and accompanied by smoke or flame, or both.

Where possible, the design provides for testing to demonstrate that these reliability requirements will be met during operation.

This provision takes into account the operation of control and safety systems. Inadvertent operation of all or part of the ECCS will have no detrimental effect on plant safety. The purpose of this regulatory document is to set out the expectations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission CNSC with respect to the design of new water-cooled nuclear power plants NPPs or plants. Taking volumetric changes and leakage into account, the design provides control of coolant inventory and pressure to ensure that specified design limits are not exceeded in normal operation.


The design provides the means for detecting levels and distributions of neutron flux. In such cases, the reasons for the lack of separation and justification for the space sharing arrangement is explained in the design documentation. Personnel access to the containment is through airlocks that are equipped with doors that are interlocked to ensure that at least one of the doors is closed during normal operation, AOOs, and DBAs. This includes the use of complementary design features to prevent accident progression and to mitigate the consequences of selected severe accidents.

These requirements and limitations, together with the results of safety analysis, form the basis for establishing the OLCs according to which the plant will be authorized to operate, as discussed in subsection 4.

To demonstrate achievement of the safety objectives, a comprehensive hazard analysis, a deterministic safety analysis, and a probabilistic safety assessment are carried out. The design applies the principles of defence-in-depth to minimize sensitivity to PIEs.

With achievement of these objectives, any radiological consequences should be minor and below prescribed limits, and the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences is expected to be extremely low. Risk significant system Any plant system whose failure to meet design and performance ncsc could result in unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons, to national security, or to the environment.

At least one rdd-337 of shutdown is independently capable of quickly rendering the nuclear reactor subcritical from normal operation, in AOOs, and in DBAs by an adequate margin, on the assumption of a single failure. Pressure boundary A boundary of any pressure-retaining vessel, system, or component of a nuclear or non-nuclear system. The design includes provisions for adequate redundancy, reliability, and effectiveness, to allow for online maintenance and online testing of systems important to safety, except where these activities are not possible due to access control restrictions.

A top-down software development process is used to facilitate verification and validation activities. Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere, that penetrates the containment structure and is not part of a closed system, is to be provided with two isolation barriers that meet the following expectations:.